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A FIXED STAR IN SHIFTING SKIES:  
BARNETTE AND CIVIL RIGHTS LAW  
Leslie Kendrick* 
In Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, the 
Court invoked one of its own precedents for an idea that at first glance seems 
mundane: “Just as ‘no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be 
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion,’ it is 
not, as the Court has repeatedly held, the role of the State or its officials to 
prescribe what shall be offensive.”1 
The Court’s language and sentiment draw from Justice Jackson’s 
famous words on compelled speech in West Virginia State Board of 
Education v. Barnette:  
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it 
is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be 
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters 
of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their 
faith therein. If there are any circumstances which permit an 
exception, they do not now occur to us.2  
The Barnette Court offered this neutrality principle as the reason that a school 
board could not compel schoolchildren to say the Pledge of Allegiance, a 
reversal of the Court’s holding on the same issue from only three years 
before.3 The Barnette Court treated its neutrality principle as both bedrock 
constitutional law and an absolute. The Barnette neutrality maxim has 
received criticism, however, for being both mistaken and overly broad and 
robust. On the first count, some have suggested that the liberal ideal of state 
neutrality reflected in Barnette is incoherent: a state committed to neutrality 
is committed to neutrality as a value, which is at odds with entire idea of the 
 
*Vice Dean and David H. Ibbeken ‘71 Research Professor of Law at the University of Virginia School of 
Law. The author would like to thank Anna Noone, Micah Schwartzman, Elizabeth Sepper, Howard 
Wasserman, and the participants and students at the FIU Law Review Symposium on Barnette at 75. 
1 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1731 (2018) 
(quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)). 
2 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642. By way of noting a possible exception, in a footnote following this 
sentence, the Court observed that those in military service, including those drafted into it, “are under many 
duties and may not claim many freedoms that we hold inviolable as to those in civilian life.” Id. at 642 
n.19. 
3 Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) (upholding mandatory Pledge of 
Allegiance). 
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state being neutral.4 On the second, there is great disagreement about the 
scope of the maxim and its robustness within its scope.5 Some have expressed 
doubt that a prohibition on compelled speech is a required, or even desirable, 
feature of a right of freedom of speech.6 Others have suggested that the 
prescription of state neutrality inherent in Barnette is too broad or too strong.7 
Even as some criticize Barnette, its scope continues to expand. 
Masterpiece contains no fewer than three new deployments of Barnette. One 
is a central claim in the litigation, that cake baking is speech and therefore 
protected by the Barnette principle from interference by the government.8 
One is the Supreme Court’s deployment of Barnette in its disposition of the 
case, which suggested that the Colorado courts violated Barnette in how they 
handled the complaint in Masterpiece. One is an argument made by some of 
petitioner’s amici but not explicitly embraced by the Court, which implies 
that Barnette means that civil rights law is constitutionally suspect. All of 
these neutrality arguments will arise again. All pit the First Amendment 
against other long-standing legal principles.  
I. 
The first deployment of Barnette in Masterpiece was part of the First 
Amendment speech claims at the center of the litigation in the lower courts. 
The petitioner-baker argued that making wedding cakes constituted “speech” 
under the First Amendment and that therefore being required under Colorado 
civil rights law to make a wedding cake for a same-sex couple constituted 
compelled speech in violation of the constitution. The baker claimed that his 
being required to make a cake for the couple’s wedding was akin to 
 
4 See, e.g., LARRY ALEXANDER, IS THERE A RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION? (2005). 
5 On the importance of considering the scope of First Amendment rules, see, e.g., Frederick 
Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 
117 HARV. L. REV. 1765 (2004). 
6 Larry Alexander, Compelled Speech, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 147 (2006). 
7 For example, government entities argue that the First Amendment’s existing neutrality principle 
does not recognize the non-invidious reasons that states and municipalities might have to treat different 
content differently. This view is on display, for instance, in litigation regarding local signage ordinances. 
See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015). It is also in play in Police Department of 
Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972), where the city contended that it had to exempt labor picketing 
from a buffer zone around schools to comply with the requirements of the National Labor Relations Act. 
The Supreme Court, meanwhile, concluded that the labor exemption made the ordinance impermissibly 
non-neutral. Id. Some Supreme Court Justices have suggested that the application of the neutrality 
principle should be more flexible. See, e.g., Reed, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (with Justices Kagan and Breyer 
endorsing a balancing test); United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012) (same); Bartnicki v. Vopper, 
532 U.S. 514, 533 (2001) (with Justice Stevens noting issues on “both sides of the constitutional 
calculus”); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 431 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring) (with Stevens 
proposing a five-factor “constitutional calculus” to replace the current approach). 
8 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1728 (2018). 
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schoolchildren in West Virginia being required to say the Pledge of 
Allegiance.  
Throughout the course of the litigation, both parties and commentators 
assumed that the free-speech issue would determine the outcome, but in oral 
argument it became clear that the petitioner’s claim that he had suffered 
religious discrimination preoccupied several of the Justices. The Court’s 
opinion ultimately hinged on freedom of religion, not freedom of speech. The 
Court determined that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission exhibited 
religious animus toward the baker in disposing of the case.9 The Court did, 
however, address the speech question briefly, in order to urge caution:  
The free speech aspect of this case is difficult, for few 
persons who have seen a beautiful wedding cake might have 
thought of its creation as an exercise of protected speech. 
This is an instructive example, however, of the proposition 
that the application of constitutional freedoms in new 
contexts can deepen our understanding of their meaning. 
 
One of the difficulties in this case is that the parties disagree 
as to the extent of the baker’s refusal to provide service. If a 
baker refused to design a special cake with words or images 
celebrating the marriage—for instance, a cake showing 
words with religious meaning—that might be different from 
a refusal to sell any cake at all. In defining whether a baker’s 
creation can be protected, these details might make a 
difference.10 
The Court then turned away from the speech question, because it found 
the religious animus issue clearer. Nevertheless, the Court’s dictum suggests 
that the speech question will return to the Supreme Court, as it already has in 
lower courts.  
Much has been written, and will continue to be written, about whether 
commercial services open to the public should count as “speech” for purposes 
of freedom of speech.11 This is not my major theme here, except to observe 
that, if such activities and their regulation by standard public 
accommodations laws did implicate the First Amendment, then litigation in 
the civil rights era would have looked very different. At the time, litigants 
who could have claimed their activities were speech did not do so, because 
 
9 Id. at 1736–37, 1740. 
10 Id. at 1723. 
11 See Erica Goldberg, “Good Orthodoxy” and the Legacy of Barnette, 13 FIU L. REV. 639 (2019); 
Abner S. Greene, Barnette and Masterpiece Cakeshop: Some Unanswered Questions, 13 FIU L. REV. 667 
(2019). 
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the claim at the time seemed so incredibly far-fetched. Now, litigants argue 
that their activities are inherently “speech” for purposes of freedom of speech 
or that, as the Court suggests, their activities are sometimes “speech,” such 
as when there is writing on a cake or a discussion about cake design.12 To 
start down this road is to reconfigure what has been considered a purely 
commercial realm subject to civil rights laws into a hodge-podge where some 
commercial actors can claim immunity to the extent that they can 
characterize their activities as speech. This is an extraordinary step. It is 
consistent with other current efforts to utilize the First Amendment to 
deregulate the commercial sphere, and it also undermines a core settlement 
of the civil rights era. The duty of Ollie’s Barbeque to serve African-
Americans does not, and should not, turn on whether the restaurant is serving 
precooked food or catering a customized lunch.13 The duty of Heart of 
Atlanta Motel to serve African-Americans does not, and should not, turn on 
whether the hotel is being asked to rent a room to a traveler or to host a 
wedding.14 The duty of a baker to serve customers regardless of sexual 
orientation does not, and should not, turn on whether there is writing on the 
cake.  
II.  
While the Supreme Court declined to decide the Barnette issue that 
dominated the litigation, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion deployed 
Barnette another way. In reversing the Colorado disposition of the case, the 
Supreme Court held that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission had 
exhibited animus toward Phillips’s religious beliefs. In finding animus, the 
Court relied partly on a perceived difference between Colorado’s treatment 
of the same sex couple’s complaint against Phillips and its treatment of three 
other complaints made by an individual named William Jack, who had 
unsuccessfully asked various bakers to prepare cakes featuring anti-gay Bible 
verses or an image of a same-sex couple with a red line through it. The 
Colorado Civil Rights Commission had found a civil rights violation in the 
same sex couple’s case but not in Jack’s cases, and the Supreme Court took 
issue with how the Colorado Civil Rights Commission and the Court of 
Appeals of Colorado had explained the difference between these cases. The 
 
12 During oral argument, Justice Sotomayor asked the plaintiff’s attorney whether the compelled 
speech argument would apply to a cake bought off the shelf. The attorney conceded that “under [his] 
theory, [the plaintiff] would need to sell that cake because he’s already created that cake with the message 
that he intended for it,” indicating that the plaintiff believed that line determining when a cake may be 
speech is not even as clear as writing on the cake. Transcript of Oral Argument at 8–9, Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111). 
13 Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 300 (1964). 
14 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 252–53 (1964). 
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Colorado Civil Rights Commission had found a civil rights violation in the 
former but not the latter. On appeal in the same-sex couple’s case, the Court 
of Appeals of Colorado, in a footnote, summarized and approved the Civil 
Rights Commission’s determinations:  
The Division found that the bakeries did not refuse [Jack’s] 
request because of his creed, but rather because of the 
offensive nature of the requested message. Importantly, 
there was no evidence that the bakeries based their decisions 
on the patron’s religion, and evidence had established that 
all three regularly created cakes with Christian themes. 
Conversely, Masterpiece admits that its decision to refuse 
Craig’s and Mullins’ requested wedding cake was because 
of its opposition to same-sex marriage which, based on 
Supreme Court precedent, we conclude is tantamount to 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.15 
It was this language that prompted the Supreme Court to deploy 
Barnette. According to the Supreme Court, this statement by the Court of 
Appeals was tantamount to the state of Colorado deciding for itself what was 
offensive.16 In the Court’s words, “The Colorado court’s attempt to account 
for the difference in treatment [between the Jack cases and the Craig and 
Mullins case] elevates one view of what is offensive over another and itself 
sends a signal of official disapproval of Phillips’ religious beliefs.”17 In the 
Supreme Court’s view, this bolstered its finding of animus. 18  
More could be said about this holding as a matter of animus doctrine, 
but more important for present purposes is that seven Justices thought this an 
appropriate occasion to invoke the “fixed star in our constitutional 
constellation” that “no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be 
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force 
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”19 In the Supreme 
Court’s view, the Colorado Court of Appeals judged Jack’s proposed cakes 
to be offensive, in violation of the Barnette maxim of state neutrality. 
Purely as a matter of interpretation, this seems implausible. The Court 
of Appeals noted that the Civil Rights Commission found that “the bakeries 
did not refuse [Jack’s] request because of his creed, but rather because of the 
 
15 Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 282 n.8 (Colo. App. 2015). 
16 Id. 
17 Masterpiece’, 138 S. Ct. at 1731. 
18 Id. (stating that the Colorado court failed to “answer the baker’s concern that the State’s practice 
was to disfavor the religious basis of his objection.”). 
19 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642. 
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offensive nature of the requested message.”20 The bakers were the parties said 
to have found Jack’s proposals offensive and to have acted on that basis. The 
Civil Rights Commission opinions cited by the Court of Appeals footnote 
make this clear: for example, one reads, “Respondent [baker] . . . avers that 
the cake order . . . was denied because the cakes included what was deemed 
to contain ‘offensive’ or ‘derogatory’ messages and imagery.”21 The Civil 
Rights Commission made factual findings about the bakers’ reasons for 
denying service, and the Court of Appeals in turn recounted the sequence of 
events. The quoted passage does not say that the Civil Rights Commission or 
the Court of Appeals themselves judged the messages offensive. At most, one 
might argue that the Court of Appeals impliedly endorsed this finding by 
referring to the “offensive nature” of Jack’s requests. But this is a strained 
interpretation. In context, the court is reporting the bakers’ reasons, not 
adopting those reasons itself.22 
As a legal matter, this interpretation is far the superior one. Civil rights 
enforcement demands that decision-making bodies sometimes make findings 
about the grounds for denials of service, and this can include offensiveness. 
Anti-discrimination laws prohibit places of public accommodation from 
refusing service on the basis of a protected status—in Colorado, “sexual 
orientation, religion, disability, race, creed, color, sex, age, national origin or 
ancestry.”23 Other refusals of service are permissible, so long as they do not 
violate other law. A baker can refuse a patron who is not wearing shoes or a 
shirt, who is unruly or threatening, or who requests a design that is offensive, 
if these actions do not also implicate a protected status. Because some denials 
of service are permissible and some are not, decision-making bodies will 
regularly have to determine the reasons behind denial of service when 
assessing claims under anti-discrimination laws.  
That is precisely what occurred in Masterpiece and the Jack cases. In 
Masterpiece, Phillips argued, among other things, that he did not engage in 
proscribed discrimination: he merely refused service because he found the 
message of the proposed cake offensive. But the Colorado courts held that, 
because Phillips would have provided the exact same product—a wedding 
cake—to an opposite-sex couple, his denial of that product to a same-sex 
couple constituted impermissible discrimination. Meanwhile, Jack argued 
that he was denied service not because his cakes were offensive, but because 
of his religious beliefs. The Colorado courts, however, found that the bakers 
refused to make the cakes because they found them offensive, and they would 
 
20 Craig, 370 P.3d at 282 n.8. 
21 Id. (citing Jack v. Gateaux, Ltd., Charge No. P20140071X (Colo. Civil Rights Div., Mar. 24, 
2015)). 
22 See id. 
23 COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601(2)(a) (2018). 
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have refused anyone who asked for those cakes. In both instances, the 
Colorado Civil Rights Commission had to distinguish between prohibited 
discrimination (based on the identity of the customer) and a permissible 
denial of service (based on the offensiveness of the design).  
Whether or not one agrees about the ultimate disposition of the cases,24 
the Supreme Court’s contention in Masterpiece cannot be correct: it cannot 
be that by assessing whether a commercial actor denied service because of 
an offensive message, the state is itself adjudicating offensiveness. 
Otherwise, the regular enforcement of civil rights laws would be 
impermissible under Barnette. The Court’s position would suggest that any 
time the state finds a reason for a denial of service, that reason must be 
imputed to the state. Thus, if a court found that a baker denied service because 
a customer was not wearing a shirt, the state would be taken to oppose 
shirtlessness, and the question would become whether shirtlessness is the 
kind of thing upon which the state can have a view. Similarly, if a Christian 
bookstore refused a customer request to order other religious materials, on 
the ground that the store was focused only on Christian works, a civil rights 
division assessment that this was a permissible denial of service would look, 
on the Court’s view, like an unconstitutional religious endorsement.25 This is 
to confuse the reasons of private actors for the position of the state. 
The majority’s stance has implications far beyond civil rights law. The 
state enforces many laws that permit private individuals to do things that the 
state itself could not do. Public accommodations’ ability to deny service on 
the basis of offensiveness is only one example. A private homeowner can 
deny access to real property for virtually unlimited reasons, including racism, 
sexism, religious discrimination, and many other bases on which the state is 
not permitted to act. The state, by enforcing trespass law, does not thereby 
acquire the motives or reasons of the homeowner. To say otherwise is to 
overwrite state action doctrine. 
Of course, some cases have challenged the line between public and 
private. In Shelley v. Kramer, the Supreme Court unanimously concluded that 
Missouri’s enforcement of racially restrictive covenants constituted state 
action in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.26 In the white primary 
cases,27 the Supreme Court ultimately concluded that the discriminatory 
practices of a private political party violated Equal Protection because the 
 
24 For further analysis, see Leslie Kendrick & Micah Schwartzman, The Etiquette of Animus, 132 
HARV. L. REV. 133 (2018). 
25 I thank Liz Sepper for the example. 
26 334 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1948). 
27 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935); Nixon v. 
Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932). 
06 - KENDRICK.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/6/19 12:43 PM 
736 FIU Law Review [Vol. 13:729 
party acted under a delegation of power from the state.28 The line between 
private and public action is not always clean, and none of this is to take a 
position on where the line ought to be. Descriptively speaking, however, 
placing the actions of Colorado in Masterpiece in the same category as 
Shelley and the white primary cases would make Masterpiece a highly 
exceptional and momentous decision. It seems unlikely that the Supreme 
Court would take such a step in passing.  
The existence of civil rights laws makes it incumbent upon the state to 
differentiate between permissible denials of service and impermissible 
discrimination. That is what Colorado was doing here. If courts’ conclusions 
about the reasons of private actors were imputed to the state, enforcement of 
civil rights law would be impossible. 
III.  
There is a final Barnette issue lurking in Masterpiece, not expressly 
endorsed by the opinion but presented to the Court in the litigation. Some 
advocates and interested groups were willing to make a larger claim, not just 
that the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA) was invalid in its 
application to Phillips but that all civil rights laws are suspect. For example, 
amicus Christian Legal Society (CLS) argued that the state of Colorado had 
no compelling interest in its civil rights law, because (1) Craig and Mullins 
were not economically harmed by the refusal of service (because other 
bakeries were willing to provide them cakes—indeed, they received one for 
free) and (2) purely dignitary harm is not a compelling reason to enforce anti-
discrimination laws.29  
On this view, anti-discrimination laws such as CADA protect against 
two types of harms: (1) the economic harm that occurs when an individual is 
denied access to the marketplace by virtue of discrimination and (2) the 
dignitary harm involved in being denied service on the same terms as other 
individuals. On CLS’s argument, Craig and Mullins suffered no economic 
harm because other bakers were willing to serve them when Phillips was not. 
Meanwhile, according to CLS, dignitary harm is not a legitimate basis on 
which to regulate. According to CLS:  
The argument from dignitary harm to individuals is, at 
bottom, an argument that petitioner’s religious practice must 
be suppressed because it offends the customer turned away. 
That argument is at odds with the whole First Amendment 
 
28 See Allwright, 321 U.S. at 663–64; Nixon, 286 U.S. at 89. 
29 See Brief of Amicus Christian Legal Society at 30–32, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. 
Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111). 
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tradition. It is settled that offensiveness is not a compelling 
interest that can justify suppressing speech.30  
According to CLS, the harm involved is that the customer who turned 
away will be offended by the denial of service. Thus, protecting against 
dignitary harm is tantamount to protecting customers from being offended. 
Protecting people from offense is not a compelling state interest, and thus 
protecting individuals and groups from the dignitary harm of discrimination 
is not a legitimate basis for enforcing civil rights law. 
This view of the harms of discrimination has far-reaching implications. 
It would seem to argue that any application of anti-discrimination law to 
religious businesses denying service to gays and lesbians would be 
unconstitutional, so long as they can find similar services elsewhere in the 
market. Moreover, religious businesses such as Piggie Park would also seem 
to enjoy immunity from civil rights laws compelling service for African-
Americans.31 So long as other businesses were willing to serve them, African-
American customers, like same-sex couples, would have no claim against 
religious owners refusing service. This goes far beyond a finding of animus 
in a particular case to the conclusion that anti-discrimination laws are 
generally unenforceable, so long as some businesses are willing to provide 
service.  
Nor do the implications stop there. CLS argues that dignitary harms 
cannot serve as a compelling interest—and that, therefore, CADA fails strict 
scrutiny. But the upshot of the argument extends further. Not only is 
“offensiveness” not a compelling state interest in free speech law, but it is 
generally an illegitimate ground for speech regulation. As Barnette says, “If 
there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, 
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, 
religion, or other matters of opinion.”32 The Court has affirmed many times 
since Barnette that laws regulating speech on the basis of offensiveness 
trigger strict scrutiny and generally will not survive.33 The implication here 
is that civil rights laws—to the extent that they seek to protect patrons against 
the dignitary harm of being denied service on the basis of race, gender, 
religion, sexual orientation, and so forth—are unconstitutional under 
Barnette.  
This view has cropped up before, notably in Supreme Court litigation in 
which CLS took the position that a University civil rights provision 
 
30 Id. at 31. 
31 Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 403 n.5 (1968) (per curiam) (summarily 
rejecting a First Amendment challenge to a civil rights law). 
32 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
33 See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988); Cohen 
v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
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prohibiting discrimination by student organizations on the basis of race, 
gender, religion, sexual orientation, and so forth would have amounted to 
impermissible viewpoint discrimination on the part of the University.34 This 
view, if adopted by the Supreme Court, would mean that civil rights laws are 
themselves a First Amendment violation. 
One set of conceptual mistakes behind this position involves the harms 
of discrimination. Its conception of economic harm ignores the harms that go 
along with inferior treatment in the market.35 It suggests that, so long as the 
putative consumer can find some willing sellers, the consumer cannot assert 
a market-related harm. This ignores the long history of market discrimination 
that compelled African-Americans in the Jim Crow South to share 
information about which businesses would serve them.36 It also ignores the 
fact that various forms of market discrimination in the Jim Crow South did 
not involve outright denial of service. On this view, Rosa Parks did not suffer 
an economic harm by having to sit at the back of the bus or enter a restaurant 
by the back door.  
At the same time, the CLS position reduces dignitary harm entirely to 
mere offense. The non-economic harms of discrimination can come in many 
guises, and though they may be offensive, that is not all they are.37 The Jim 
Crow regime was offensive to those subject to it, but reducing its harms to 
offensiveness ignores the grave wrong of the expression of state-sanctioned 
racism. Purportedly equal citizens receiving unequal treatment in public 
businesses and other public places is not simply, or even primarily, a matter 
of offense. 
Another conceptual error concerns the First Amendment: it is a failure 
to distinguish speech from conduct or, more precisely, to distinguish laws 
directed at expression from laws directed at non-expressive harms. In 
suggesting that civil rights laws impermissibly regulate based on 
“offensiveness,” CLS’s argument suggests that these laws regulate speech, 
rather than conduct—that is, the provision of service. The Supreme Court has 
roundly rejected this view in several contexts. It rejected it without comment 
in a case where litigants argued that Title VII’s prohibition of sexual 
 
34 Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal. v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 668–69 (2010). 
35 See, e.g., Elizabeth Sepper, Gays in the Moralized Marketplace, 7 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 
129 (2015); Elizabeth Sepper, Gendering Corporate Conscience, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 193, 211 
(2015). 
36 See, e.g., Jacinda Townsend, How the Green Book Helped African-American Tourists Navigate 
a Segregated Nation, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Apr. 2016), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smithsonian-
institution/history-green-book-african-american-travelers-180958506/. 
37 There is an extensive literature on the wrongs of discrimination, which includes much more 
thorough explications of dignitary harm than that offered here. See, e.g., DEBORAH HELLMAN, WHEN IS 
DISCRIMINATION WRONG? (2008); Elizabeth Sepper, A Missing Piece of the Puzzle of the Dignitary Torts, 
104 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE (forthcoming 2019). 
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harassment in the workplace violated the First Amendment.38 It rejected it in 
the context of hate crime legislation, which a defendant cast as simply 
penalizing him based on “viewpoint.”39 It rejected it when law schools 
objected to admitting military recruiters on free-speech grounds: there, the 
Court concluded that there was no free-speech claim at all, because the law 
at issue compelled conduct rather than speech.40  
Moreover, this must be true in order to prevent the freedom of speech 
from devouring the entire legal code. Public nudity laws take the view that 
public nudity is offensive to most people.41 Murder laws take the position that 
murder is bad and protect all persons from the dignitary harm of being 
murdered. Child neglect laws take the position that child neglect is bad and 
protect children from the dignitary harm of neglect. Tort law takes the 
position that tortiously injuring another is bad and protects all persons from 
the dignitary harm of being tortiously injured. Most of these laws have other 
justifications as well, but constitutional jurisprudence has never suggested 
that their expressive function is illegitimate. CLS’s position would suggest 
that it is.  
CLS puts its arguments in terms of compelling interest: it argues that 
protection against dignitary harms is not a compelling interest that would 
overcome the First Amendment interests of the baker. But the logical 
implication of the position is that civil rights protections violate the First 
Amendment. Nothing about Justice Jackson’s view in Barnette compels this 
position. Nothing about Justice Jackson’s view would support this position: 
Barnette, in all its 75 years, has never been taken to suggest that civil rights 
laws are unconstitutional. But its applications continue to evolve, as its three 
manifestations in one recent case illustrate. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Masterpiece highlights the encroachment of Barnette’s neutrality 
principle into new areas. The litigation suggested that commercial enterprises 
that can plausibly describe themselves as involving speech should have 
immunity from general regulations. The Supreme Court majority held that a 
court’s assessment that a business discriminated on the basis of offensiveness 
violated Barnette. And petitioners’ amicus suggested that civil rights laws 
themselves are unconstitutional violations of a neutrality principle. None of 
 
38 See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993). 
39 See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993). 
40 Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 60 (2006). 
41 Cf. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 567 (1991) (upholding public nudity law as 
applied to nude dancing establishment). 
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these positions was contemplated by Barnette itself, and none is compelled 
by its holding. However fixed Barnette’s star, the skies around it have shifted. 
 
